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Abstract
This paper presents a practical application of language-
based information-ﬂow control, namely, a domain-speciﬁc
web scripting language designed for interfacing with
databases. The primary goal is to provide strong enforce-
ment of conﬁdentiality and integrity policies: conﬁdential
data can be released only in permitted ways and trust-
worthy data must result from expected computations
or conform to expected patterns. Such security poli-
cies are speciﬁed in the database layer and statically
enforced for the rest of the system in an end-to-end fash-
ion.
In contrast with existing web-scripting languages, which
provide only ad hoc mechanisms for information security,
the scripting language described here uses principles based
on the well-studied techniques in information-ﬂow type sys-
tems. However, because web scripts often need to down-
grade conﬁdential data and manipulated untrusted user in-
put, they require practical and convenient ways of down-
grading secure data. To achieve this goal, the language al-
lows safe downgrading according to downgrading policies
speciﬁed by the programmer. This novel, pattern-based ap-
proach provides a practical instance of recent work on de-
limited release and relaxed noninterferenceand extends that
work by accounting for integrity policies.
1. Introduction
This paper presents a language-based approach to en-
forcing conﬁdentiality and integrity of data in typical web-
based information systems. Such systems are usually im-
plemented using a layered design in which data is stored
in the database and accessed by using a web browser.
The database management system (DBMS) provides a data
query language (for example, SQL) to store, modify and ex-
tract information from databases. Application software con-
nects to the DBMS via some programming language inter-
face and submits queries as requests for information from
the DBMS. The application software then processes the
data and send the computation results to the end-users, typ-
ically bundled as HTML. This paper focuses on a simple
yet widely used design, where relational databases such as
MySQL are used as the DBMS and web scripting languages
such as PHP are used for developing application software.
In practice, there are many security concerns for such
systems. For example, an unsafe PHP script could use
strings from untrusted inputs to compose SQL queries
and then have the DBMS execute the query, which po-
tentially allows an attacker to insert arbitrary commands
in the SQL query. PHP scripts that access conﬁden-
tial data in the database must also release them only in
permitted ways. For example, one might require that a pass-
word can be compared against user inputs but cannot be
printed to the web page verbatim, or that only the last sev-
eral digits of a social security number or a credit card
number should be displayed in the HTML output.
As these web applications become complex, the secu-
rity of the system becomes hard to manage. In the worst
case, the programmer must walk through all the code and
check every line to make sure that there are no security vio-
lations. In addition, the queries performed by the script must
comply with the desired policies on the data stored in the
database. Ensuring that all of the security requirements are
met is difﬁcult to do manually, tedious, and error-prone.
Currently, there exist only ad hoc ways to (partially)
enforce such security policies. To prevent accidental use
of untrusted inputs as parameters to safety-critical opera-
tions—thereby preventing format string attacks and mali-
cious DBMS queries—some scripting languages provide
mechanisms to track the uses of untrusted inputs, dynam-
ically checking that they are not used inappropriately. Perl,
for instance, can be run in a “taint checking” mode in
which user input strings are considered tainted until they
are matched against a programmer-supplied pattern, which
establishes that the untrusted input actually conforms to an
expected form.
In an effort to enforce the conﬁdentiality policies on the
database, experienced software developers implement most
of the security-sensitive operations in the DBMS as pro-
cedure calls in the query language, exposing explicit, re-
stricted interfaces. Programmers should use only these in-
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terfaces to perform queries in the web scripting language.
This limited interface means that the database query en-
gine can itself enforce the desired policies. Such encapsula-
tion means that the programmer needs to check at least two
things: (1) that the sensitive operations are correctly imple-
mented in the DBMS and, (2) that the query interfaces are
properly used by the web scripts. These checks must be per-
formed manually.
The above ad hoc approaches have several drawbacks.
First, they encourage that a signiﬁcant portion of the busi-
ness logic be implemented in the DBMS, which makes the
interfaces less modular and less reusable. For example, we
may require that only the last 4 digits of the credit card num-
ber can be displayed to the user. If this limitation is imple-
mented in a procedure call in the DBMS, the web script can
only get the last 4 digits of the number using that call. Se-
curity is guaranteed, but the web script cannot use the full
number to perform further queries to the database. Instead,
a dedicated procedure for this web script must be written in
the database that connect these queries together. As the busi-
ness logic becomes complex, the procedures in the DBMS
become hard to manage.
Second, doing the dynamic checks may be inefﬁcient.
For example, the user inputs in web forms usually have
constraints on them that restrict their data ranges and data
types. Such constraints are often dynamically checked mul-
tiple times by the web scripts, the DBMS procedures, and
the triggers in the databases. The reason is that the program-
ming interface between the DBMS and the application soft-
ware is either untyped or dynamically typed, and many con-
straints cannot be easily expressed as data types.
Third, the intended security policy of the system is not
apparent from its implementation. There is no explicit de-
scription of what data is considered to be conﬁdential or
what the requirements are for checking the validity of un-
trusted inputs. This makes the software more fragile (local
changes to the system can be inconsistent with the desired
global security policy) and much harder to maintain over
time.
1.1. Contributions
This paper proposes a language-based solution to
the above problems. Instead of implementing all the ac-
cess control mechanisms in the DBMS procedures or
dynamic checks, we allow the programmer to specify secu-
rity policies on the application programming interfaces of
the DBMS. Such interfaces are strongly typed. The secu-
rity policies are statically enforced in the scripting language
using an information-ﬂow type system.
Following the ideas of recent language prototypes such
as Jif [7], which extends Java, and FlowCaml [14, 9, 10],
which extends Caml, we design a security-typed lan-
guage suitable for writing web scripts. Web scripting
languages differ from general-purpose programming lan-
guages in many aspects, several of which simplify our
information-ﬂow analyses. For example, most web scripts
contain little or no state, and very limited looping con-
structs; they involve little computation and are intended
to terminate quickly. These domain-speciﬁc features al-
low us to deal with covert channels (such as the timing
channels) and some side effects more easily than in gen-
eral purpose languages.
Importantly, when we reason about the information ﬂows
in such web scripts, downgrading is very common. Many
web scripts read sensitive data from databases and release
them to the end user (i.e. declassiﬁcation of conﬁdential
data). Conversely, web scripts also take untrusted user in-
puts and use them to synthesize database queries which can
alter trusted data (i.e. endorsement of low integrity data). To
make information-ﬂowcontrol effective, downgradingmust
be controlled in a safe manner.
Our contributions include several important extensions
to prior research [5, 12]. First, we present a simple yet gen-
eral architecture for building secure web systems; this pa-
per emphasizes the scripting-language component of that
architecture. Second, our language addresses the problem
of downgrading in information-ﬂow systems by providing
a practical instance of our recent theoretical framework
on downgrading policies [5]. Third, we extend the frame-
work to include integrity policies and conditional down-
grading policies that use a novel pattern-matching sublan-
guage to express information-ﬂow constraints. Conditional
downgrading policies are extremely useful for specifying
requirements that involve run-time identity tests.
The rest of the paper is organized as the following. Sec-
tion 2 discusses a layered architecture for information ﬂow
control in online information systems. Section 3 presents a
language of security policies, deﬁnes the security levels and
formalize downgrading. Section 4 presents the abstract syn-
tax of the web scripting language, shows a program exam-
ple and introduces its type system. Section 5 discusses is-
sues with untrusted code and related work. Section 6 con-
cludes.
2. Mandatory access control in online infor-
mation systems
2.1. System architecture
Typical web-based systems consist of a database, a
database query language and various components such as
scripts and web servers that work together in a multi-tiered
fashion. These systems can have massive amounts of conﬁ-
dential and trusted information, with quite complex security
policies. For example, recent laws in the United States man-
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Figure 1: Information-ﬂow control in web-based information systems
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date complicated procedures for releasing medical informa-
tion about patients; such policies must be enforced in the
information management systems used by health care of-
ﬁces. Given the ubiquity and familiarity of the web, provid-
ing a web interface to such information would be valuable,
but enforcing the appropriate security policies is a chal-
lenging task.
We propose a simpliﬁed, yet general architecture for
such web-based information systems, as depicted in Fig-
ure 1. The key elements are:
• The storage layer: a database management system that
stores and manages conﬁdential and trustworthy data
using database schemas, tables, views and a database
query language.
• The access control layer: a query interface language
that controls the release and update of information
in the database. A query interface provides means to
access the database, but also speciﬁes language-level
information-ﬂow policies on the interface.
• The presentation layer: a web scripting language that
executes the queries, manipulate the results and gener-
ate web pages for end users. The information ﬂow poli-
cies from the query interfaces are enforced in the web
scripting language.
It is desirable to use security-typed languages to pro-
gram these systems, because language-based information
ﬂow control provides strong end-to-end security guaran-
tees [13]: information-ﬂow policies are speciﬁed at the end-
points of the program (on variables and module interfaces)
and enforced in the whole program. However, in these prac-
tical systems, conﬁdential data lives outside the programs
that manipulate them. The source of such data is not pro-
gram variables or function call interfaces, but rather the
databases themselves. To enforce information ﬂow policies
across the whole system, it is necessary to specify the poli-
cies directly at the very end of the system, namely, at the
database level, and enforce these information ﬂow policies
across the boundaries of different components.
The following sections outline how the pieces of this
architecture ﬁt together; subsequent sections explain the
scripting language in more detail.
2.2. Policy speciﬁcation in the DBMS interface
We require that all database queries are accessed via
strongly typed programming interfaces provided by the
DBMS. This is shown in Figure 1 as the access control
layer, which, for this example contains two queries GetID
andFetchRecords. The application programmer can use
only the declared interfaces to access the database but can-
not execute arbitrary SQL queries. As described in the in-
troduction, this is a standard engineering practice, as it man-
dates that all the security-related queries be implemented
as procedure calls in the DBMS layer. However, because
our scripting language types include security policy infor-
mation, this layer does not have to enforce all the security
policies in the DBMS. Instead, it can specify security poli-
cies as types on the output of the queries and let the appli-
cation software enforce these policies using language-based
information-ﬂow control. For example, the programmer can
declare the output of a query to have security level “secret”,
so the web scripts using this query will not leak its informa-
tion to public places.
One issue is how to propagate the typing information
from databases queries to the scripting language. In rela-
tional databases, a query returns a table that has a ﬁxed
number of columns. The type of each column is statically
known. The script reads the query results iteratively in a
row-by-row fashion, so the schema of a table can be trans-
lated to a tuple type that represents the data types for each
column. As shown below, our scripting language provides
built-in constructs for accessing rows of query results.
In our architecture, information-ﬂow policies are speci-
ﬁed on the query interface types. For conﬁdentiality, we can
annotate the output as secret so that it is not allowed to be
leaked to public places. For integrity, we can annotate the
argument of a query as untainted so that its value is not af-
fected by tainted inputs. Besides these built-in levels, pro-
grammers can specify downgrading policies as security lev-
els that describe how secret values can become public and
how untrusted values become trusted. Section 3 presents a
generalized framework of these information ﬂow policies.
2.3. Policy enforcement in the web scripting
language
This remainder of this paper presents the design of a
web scripting language similar to PHP, which is used for
the presentation layer shown in Figure 1. The major differ-
ence with PHP is that the queries to databases are strongly
typed. The arguments and results of queries are annotated
with information-ﬂow policies. The interface to each query
is explicitly deﬁned in the program, which makes auditing
the software for security and maintenance purposes easier
for humans and provides the information needed by our
type checker to determine whether the web script satis-
ﬁes the policies. At run-time, when the script connects to
the DBMS, the type signature of each query interface is
matched against the interface provided in the DBMS.
At a high level, a web script takes some input data
provided by interaction with the user and the DBMS and
produces HTML data as output. The input data coming
from the client web browser can be treated as having the
security labels public and tainted. Results obtained from
database queries have security policy speciﬁcations deﬁned
Proceedings of the 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW’05) 
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Labels l ::= cl ! il
Conﬁdentiality Labels cl ::= {cp1, . . . , cpk} | secret | public
Integrity Labels il ::= {ip1, . . . , ipk} | tainted | untainted
Conﬁdentiality Policies cp ::= c | s |  | ⊕ cp1, . . . , cpk | if cp cp cp | this
Integrity Policies ip ::= c | s |  | ⊕ ip1, . . . , ipk | if ip ip ip
Trusted Variables s ::= si
Constants c ::= ci
Operators ⊕ ::= + | − | hash | built-in operators...
Downgrading Actions a ::= c | s |  | ⊕ a1, . . . , ak | if a a a | this
Figure 2: The pattern language for security labels
by the query interfaces. The web script performs some com-
putation using these inputs from different security levels
and produce strings that constitute the resulting web page,
which has security level public. Additionally, the query ar-
guments sent along with the query are also outputs and they
may have required security levels such as untainted. In our
model, the security policies on the outputs of the script are
enforced by an information-ﬂow type system, which pro-
vides end-to-end security guarantees on the input–output re-
lationship of the program. The following sections present
our scripting language features in detail.
3. Security levels for conﬁdentiality and
integrity
In many conventional information-ﬂow type systems, the
security levels considered are limited to the simple lattices
publicsecret for conﬁdentiality and untaintedtainted
for integrity. Our scripting language interprets these secu-
rity levels in a more general framework, where downgrad-
ing policies [5] are used to express the security levels of
data. A security level is simply a non-empty set of down-
grading policies, where each policy describes the necessary
computation that must be performed in order to downgrade
the data at this security level. Such policies are expressed
in a small pattern-matching language. Conﬁdentiality poli-
cies and integrity policies are mostly symmetric in our lan-
guage. The following subsections present the syntax and the
semantics of these security levels.
3.1. Input variables and the pattern language
Each program takes some input data and produce some
outputs. We classify the program inputs into two kinds:
• Untrusted input: inputs with security level tainted and
public. Untrusted inputs come from the user inputs via
web forms.
• Trusted input: inputs with security level untainted and
secret, or other predeﬁned security levels. Trusted in-
puts come from database query interfaces and run-time
API calls. In our scripting language, such inputs are
represented as trusted variables. For example, the root
password can be modeled as a secret and untainted in-
put to the login process. We use the metavariable s to
represent such trusted input variables.
The syntax of security labels is deﬁned in Figure 2. Each
label has its conﬁdentiality part and integrity part. Each con-
ﬁdentiality (or integrity) label is a non-empty set of policies.
Special names such as secret, public, untainted and tainted
can also be used as labels; they can be interpreted as sets of
policies as shown in Figure 3. The next two subsections ex-
plain the semantics of these labels.
secret ≡ {c0} public ≡ {this}
tainted ≡ {} untainted ≡ {ip |  /∈ ip}
Figure 3: Special security Labels
3.2. Conﬁdentiality labels
Syntactically, a conﬁ dentiality policy is an expression
embedded with this and . The meaning of such a policy
is some computation required to declassify (or downgrade)
the secret. When this is replaced by the annotated secret
value and every  is replaced by a value at security level
public, the result of the expression is at public. For exam-
ple, if the password p has a policy “this = ” and x is
a public value, then the expression p=x is a public value.
This policy allows the password be compared to untrusted
values, but does not allow the password be leaked by other
means.
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Policy equivalence: We write cp1 ≡ cp2 to denote that
the two policies have the same semantic meaning. For ex-
ample, x + y ≡ y + x. To keep things simple in this paper,
we use only syntactical equivalence.
A conﬁ dentiality label is a non-empty set of conﬁden-
tiality policies. Such a label describes a security level for
conﬁdentiality. If data x has a conﬁdentiality label cl =
{cp1, . . . , cpk}, it means x can only be downgraded to
public by using one of the policies cpi in that label. In
other words, a label speciﬁes possible ways (policies) to
downgrade the data it annotates. For example, the label
{this = , hash(this)} on a password value also allows the
password be leaked by computing its hash.We deﬁne the in-
terpretation of a label cl to be an inﬁnite set of policies:
S(cl)

= {cp1 | cp1 ≡ [cp2/this]cp3, cp2 ∈ cl, si /∈ cp3}
Intuitively, it means that if cp2 is a valid downgrading pol-
icy, i.e. cp2 represents a public expression, we can put cp2
in another context cp3 to yield another downgrading policy
cp1, as long as the context cp3 does not contain trusted se-
cret variables (which we denote as si /∈ cp3). The interpre-
tation of a label is the set of all policies that can be derived
from the policies in that label. For example, if “hash(this)”
is a valid downgrading policy, then it implies the policy
“hash(this)%16” is also valid.
In this framework, both secret and public can be ex-
pressed using conﬁdentiality policies: secret can be repre-
sented by a constant policy {c0}, which trivially hides the
secret after substituting this with the secret. The interpre-
tation of secret is all the pattern expressions that does not
contain this and secret variables. The security level public
can be represented by the expression {this}, which says the
annotated value can be straightforwardly treated as public
data. The interpretation of public includes all the pattern ex-
pressions that does not contain trusted secret variables. The
ordering on labels is then deﬁned using set inclusion:
cl1  cl2 ⇐⇒ S(cl2) ⊆ S(cl1)
As an example, it is easy to verify that public  {this =
, hash(this)}  {this = }  secret. Intuitively, higher
security levels contains fewer downgrading policies. The
join of labels is interpreted as the join of the label interpre-
tations, which can be conservatively approximated by tak-
ing the intersection of two labels.
These security labels allow us to formally deﬁne down-
grading in programs. We use the metavariable a to repre-
sent actions, which speciﬁes a fragment of computation on
a value. In an action expression, this denotes the value of
interest and all the  represent values of public level. A la-
bel cl can be downgraded to another label using an action
a:
⇓ (cl, a) = {cp1 | [a/this]cp1 ≡ cp2, cp2 ∈ cl}
Here, ⇓ (cl, a) is the label of data obtained by taking data
with label cl and performing action a on it. For example,
suppose we deﬁne the following labels and actions:
cl1

= {(hash(this)%4)=} a1

= hash(this)
cl2

= {(this%4)=} a2

= this%4
cl3

= {this=} a3

= {this=}
We have ⇓ (cl1, a1) = cl2, ⇓ (cl2, a2) = cl3, ⇓
(cl3, a3) = public. If a variable x has security level cl1
and y is public, then the expression hash(x) has level cl2,
hash(x)%4 has level cl3, (hash(x)%4) = y has level
public. Intuitively, an action is a pattern that matches the
computation in the program: this matches a secret value
to be downgraded and  matches any expressions at level
public. Each conﬁdentiality label corresponds to a state ma-
chine that models downgrading, where states are labels and
transitions are downgrading actions.
3.3. Integrity labels
Integrity labels are largely the dual of conﬁdentiality la-
bels with several subtle differences. Conﬁdentiality policies
specify what can be done with the data in the future, in-
tegrity policy specify what has been done to the data in
the past. An integrity policy is an expression embedded
with , meaning an expression that has computed the anno-
tated value as a result, where each  represents an untrusted,
tainted input to the expression. For example, if the variable
x is tainted, then the expression x%4 has an integrity pol-
icy “%4”, which states an integrity constraint on the re-
sult. An integrity label is a non-empty set of integrity poli-
cies, where each policy describes an expression that could
have computed the value as a result. If the value x has an
integrity label il = {ip1, . . . , ipk}, then it must have been
computed using one of the expression ipj ∈ il. Most inter-
esting integrity labels have only one policy in them, because
adding policies to a label onlyweakens the integrity guaran-
tee. Similar to conﬁdentiality labels, the interpretation of
integrity labels is deﬁned as:
S(il)

= {ip1 | ip1 ≡ [ip2/j]ip3, ip3 ∈ il}
The ordering on integrity labels is deﬁned as:
il1  il2 ⇐⇒ S(il1) ⊆ S(il2)
In this framework, tainted can simply be represented as
{}, as this is dual case of public in conﬁdentiality. The
security label untainted corresponds to an inﬁnite label
{ip |  /∈ ip}, which includes all expressions that do not
use tainted inputs. Although we have untainted  tainted,
many interesting policies do not sit between these two se-
curity levels. For example, {min(, 10)} has no direct or-
dering with untainted. This explains why traditional def-
initions of noninterference gives a weak form of integrity
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Variables x ::= xi
Expressions e ::= c | s | x | ⊕ e1, . . . , ek | declassify(e, L : a) | endorse(e, L : a)
Commands p ::=  | p; p | x := e | [L :]if e p p | while e p | print e
| x := query name (e1, . . . , ek) | (s1, . . . , sk) := readrow x
Types τ ::= string l | query name
Programs Prog ::= Inputs Queries V ars Boby
Input Input ::= field⇒ s
Query Query ::= name (x1 : il1, . . . , xj : ilj) ⇒ (s1 : cl1, . . . , sk : clk)
Variables V ar ::= x : cl ! il
Body Body ::= c Body | p Body | 
Figure 4: Abstract syntax
guarantee: there are many interesting integrity policies be-
sides untainted. In fact, untainted is a very coarse security
level and it can be further strengthened. For example, the
integrity label il1

= {s2 + s3} satisﬁes il1  untainted.
It says a very strong integrity guarantee: values at this in-
tegrity level must be equal to the sum of two trusted pro-
gram inputs. An even stronger integrity label {0}works like
a singleton type where the only inhabitant is zero. Down-
grading for integrity labels is formalized as:
⇓ (il, a)

= {ip1 | [ip2/this]a ≡ ip1, ip2 ∈ il}
For example, suppose
a1

= ToInt(this) il1

= {ToInt()}
a2

= min(this, 10) il2

= {min(ToInt(), 10)}
a3

= max(this, 5) il3

= {max(min(ToInt(), 10), 5)}
We have ⇓ (tainted, a1) = il1, ⇓ (il1, a2) = il2,
⇓ (il2, a3) = il3. If a variable x has security level il2, then
the expression max(x, 5) has level il3.
4. The web scripting language
4.1. Language syntax and semantics
The web scripting language provides a programming
model similar to PHP. The abstract syntax is shown in Fig-
ure 4. Program fragments are inserted to the web page us-
ing special tags like <?ssp ... !ssp>. At the top level,
a web script consists of a header and several program frag-
ments. A header includes the mapping from the form in-
puts to variable names and the deﬁnition of query inter-
faces. A query interface includes the name of the query, the
query arguments, the result variables and the security levels
of these variables. Each program fragment is a command.
Commands can be sequential composition of commands,
assignments, branches, loops, print statements, and query
operations. For simplicity, function calls are not presented
in this paper, although they are not fundamentally difﬁ-
cult to include. One other difference from PHP and other
information-ﬂow languages is that a branch statement can
have a tag L on it; such tags can be used in declassify and
endorse expressions, which will be explained later. When
the script is executed by the web server, each program frag-
ment is substituted by its output using the print statement.
Except query handles, all values are simply strings in this
language.
The type system of the web scripting language is pre-
sented in Figures 5, 7 and 8. The type system statically con-
trols the information ﬂow in the programs. Conﬁdentiality
labels and integrity labels are tracked separately. Like Jif
and FlowCaml, the type system generally disallows infor-
mation ﬂow from high security levels to low security levels,
where the ordering of security labels is deﬁned as in Sec-
tion 3. For conﬁdentiality, implicit information ﬂows are
also tracked by adding a program counter label pc to the
typing context. The pc label is only permitted to be either
public or secret, because the downgrading policies written
by the programmer apply only to expressions, not to con-
trol ﬂow.
A typing judgment for an expression has the form
Γ,Φ 	 e : τ , where Γ is the typing context for vari-
ables and Φ is the context of conditional expressions, ex-
plained below. The typing judgments for commands
are of the form Γ,Φ, pc 	 p meaning that the com-
mand p is well-typed under the contexts Γ,Φ and the pro-
gram counter pc. For example, the C-ASSIGN rule only
allows information ﬂow from low security levels to high se-
curity levels. It also take pc label into account to track
implicit ﬂows.
The program writes its output using the print state-
ment. Output data is publicly visible to the user, so the
type system must ensure that the conﬁdentiality label of the
output is public in the C-PRINT rule. Furthermore, the pc
Proceedings of the 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW’05) 
1063-6900/05 $20.00 © 2005 IEEE 
Γ,Φ, pc 	 p1 Γ,Φ, pc 	 p2
Γ,Φ, pc 	 p1; p2
C-COMPOSITION
Γ(x) = string cl1 ! il1
Γ,Φ 	 e : string cl2 ! il2 cl2  cl1 unionsq pc il2  il1
Γ,Φ, pc 	 x := e
C-ASSIGN
Γ,Φ 	 e : string cl ! il cl ≡ public pc ≡ public
Γ,Φ, pc 	 print e
C-PRINT
Γ,Φ 	 e : string cl ! il
cl ≡ public Γ,Φ, public 	 p pc ≡ public
Γ,Φ, pc 	 while e p
C-WHILE
Γ,Φ 	 e : string cl ! il cl unionsq pc  public
Γ,Φ ∪ (L+ : e), public 	 p1 Γ,Φ ∪ (L
− : e), public 	 p2
Γ,Φ, pc 	 L : if e p1 p2
C-IF-PUB
Γ,Φ 	 e : string cl ! il
Γ,Φ, secret 	 p1 Γ,Φ, secret 	 p2
Γ,Φ, pc 	 L : if e p1 p2
C-IF-SEC
Q(name) = (x1 : il1, . . . , xk : ilk) ⇒ (. . .)
Γ,Φ 	 ei : string cli ! il
′
i cli ≡ public
il′i  ili pc ≡ public Γ ∪ (x : query name),Φ, pc 	 p
Γ,Φ, pc 	 x := query name (e1, . . . , ek); p
C-QUERY
Γ(x) = query name
Q(name) = (. . .) ⇒ (S1 : cl1, . . . , Sk : clk)
cl′i

= pc unionsq [s1/S1] . . . [sk/Sk]cli
pc ≡ public Γ ∪ (si : string cl
′
i ! {si}),Φ, pc 	 p
Γ,Φ, pc 	 (s1, . . . , sk) := readrow x; p
C-READROW
Figure 5: Command typing rules: Γ,Φ, pc 	 p
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01 <?ssp_header
02 FormInputs ( "UserName" => u, "Password" => p, "QueryYear" => y );
03
04 Query GetID ( username: !tainted ) => (
05 PASSWORD : {this=*},
06 ID : {if (PASSWORD=*) this 0}
07 );
08
09 Query FetchRecords( index: !untainted, year:!{Integer(*)} ) => (
10 ORDERID : public,
11 AMOUNT : public,
12 CCNUM : {tailstr(this,4)}
13 );
14
15 Variables ( pub_id: public!untainted );
16
17 !ssp_header>
18 <html><head><title>....</title>
19 <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
20 </head><body>
21 ......
22 <?ssp
23 q1 := query GetID(u);
24 if ( empty(q1) ) {
25 print ’Unknown username’;
26 } else {
27 (pwd, id) := readrow(q1);
28 L_AUTH: if (pwd=p)
29 {
30 print ’Username = ’; print u;
31 pub_id := declassify(id, L_AUTH:(pwd=*));
32 print ’School ID =’; print pub_id;
33 q2 := query FetchRecords( pub_id, Integer(y) );
34 while (!empty(q2)) {
35 (orderid, amoumt, ccnum) := readrow(q2);
36 print ’Order ID = ’; print orderid;
37 print ’Amount = ’; print amount;
38 print ’Credit Card = XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-’;
39 print tailstr(ccnum, 4);
40 }
41 } else {
42 print ’Wrong password’;
43 }
44 }
45 !ssp>
46 .....
Figure 6: A web script example
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Γ,Φ 	 c : string public ! {c}
E-CONST
Γ(s) = string cl ! il
Γ,Φ 	 s : string cl ! il
E-TRUSTVAR
Γ(x) = string cl ! il
Γ,Φ 	 x : string cl ! il
E-VAR
Γ,Φ 	 x : query name
Γ,Φ 	 empty(x) : string public ! tainted
E-EMPTYTEST
Γ,Φ 	 e1 : string cl1 ! il1 Γ,Φ 	 e2 : string cl2 ! il2
CL(⊕, cl1, cl2, il1, il2) = cl3 IL(⊕, cl1, cl2, il1, il2) = il3
Γ,Φ 	 e1 ⊕ e2 : string cl3 ! il3
E-OP
Γ,Φ 	 e1 : string cl1 ! il
Φ(L+) = e2 match(Γ, e2, a) cl2

=⇓ (cl, if a this 0)
Γ,Φ 	 declassify(e1, L : a) : string cl2 ! il
E-DECLASSIFY+
Γ,Φ 	 e1 : string cl1 ! il
Φ(L−) = e2 match(Γ, e2, a) cl2

=⇓ (cl, if a 0 this)
Γ,Φ 	 declassify(e1, L : a) : string cl2 ! il
E-DECLASSIFY-
Figure 7: Expression typing rules: Γ,Φ 	 e : τ
label in the typing context of the print statement must
also be public to prevent implicit information ﬂow such as
“if secret then print 1 else print 0”. Se-
cret data must be downgraded to public data before they can
be printed to web pages.
Figure 6 shows an actual web script. It has two query
interfaces to the database. The script takes the user input,
performs queries to the database, reads the results from the
query and generates a web page for the end user. The fol-
lowing subsections walk through this example step-by-step
to present the language features.
4.2. Query interfaces and type declarations
Query interfaces and variables are declared in the header
section of a script. In Figure 6, the script header from line
1 to line 17 speciﬁes all the input/output data types. Line
2 speciﬁes the inputs ﬁelds submitted from the web forms
in a HTTP request and maps them to variables u, p and y
in the scripting language. All of these variables are consid-
ered to be public, untrusted data; they have security level
“public ! tainted” in the type system.
Two query interfaces are deﬁned in lines 4-13. At run-
time, they must match their speciﬁcations in the DBMS in-
terfaces. The ﬁrst query,GetID, looks up a user name in the
database and returns the user’s password and identity num-
ber; both are secrets and cannot be directly released to the
public. The second query FetchRecords uses the user’s
identity number to look up the user’s transaction history in
the database.
Query arguments: Integrity labels are speciﬁed for
query arguments in the interface; their conﬁdentiality labels
are public by default as required by the C-QUERY type-
checking rule. For example, the query argument index on
line 9 has an integrity label untainted, which makes it im-
possible to pass an untrusted tainted value to index.
The argument year on line 9 requires a mandatory con-
version from an arbitrary string to a string that contain
only an integer, which forbids certain SQL string at-
tacks.
Query results: Query results are modeled as trusted
variables in the type system. All the trusted variables are
treated as read only in the type system: they cannot be up-
dated using direct assignments. Conﬁdentiality labels are
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CL(⊕, cl1, cl2, il1, il2) = secret
CL-SECRET
cl1  public cl2  public
CL(⊕, cl1, cl2, il1, il2) = public
CL-PUBLIC
il2  {ip}
a1

= this⊕ ip match(a1, a2) cl3

=⇓ (cl1, a2)
CL(⊕, cl1, public, il1, il2) = cl3
CL-DOWNGRADE(L)
IL(⊕, il1, il2) = tainted
IL-TAINTED
il1  untainted il2  untainted
IL(⊕, il1, il2) = untainted
IL-UNTAINTED
IL(⊕, {ip1}, {ip2}) = {ip1 ⊕ ip2}
IL-COMPOSE
Figure 8: Downgrading rules
speciﬁed for query results, and their integrity labels are im-
plicitly deﬁned by the C-READROW rule: a variable s has
an integrity label {s}. On line 5, the conﬁdentiality label
for PASSWORD states that the only possible way to leak in-
formation about the password is to compare it with a value
at level public.
A row of the query result is read together using the
readrow command. The conﬁdentiality policy of a query
result variable can mention names of other variables in the
same query. For example, the variable ID on line 6 has a
policy that mentions the variable PASSWORD, saying that
the the ID string can only be disclosed if a publicly known
string matches PASSWORD on the same row of the query re-
sult. This policy speciﬁes a run-time test of identity infor-
mation.
4.3. Downgrading
Downgrading is the key feature of this type system. The
downgrading policies speciﬁed by the query interfaces con-
trol how conﬁdential data is released and how trustworthy
information is updated. There are two downgrading mecha-
nisms in the type system.
Implicit downgrading: Downgrading happens implic-
itly in each step of computation that uses the built-in opera-
tors. Without loss of generality, we present only the typing
rules for binary operators in this paper. In traditional secu-
rity type systems, if x has security level l1 and y has level l2,
the result of x⊕y has security level l1unionsql2, which is an upper-
bound of l1 and l2. The E-OP rule in Figure 7 is backward-
compatible with those type systems. However, E-OP exam-
ines the labels of the operands more carefully using rules
in Figure 8. The CL-SECRET, CL-PUBLIC, IL-TAINTED
and IL-UNTAINTED rules are standard rules—they give the
label of the result by approximating the join of the argu-
ments. The IL-COMPOSE rule, however, attempts to com-
pute the integrity label for the result when both operands
have good integrity guarantees. The CL-DOWNGRADE(L)
rule declassiﬁes the left operand using an action that corre-
sponds to the use of the ⊕ operator (there is a symmetric
version that operates on the right side of ⊕). The integrity
label of the other operand is also used to describe this ac-
tion.
It is possible that more than one action a2 can be cho-
sen in the CL-DOWNGRADE rule. For example, the action
this = c0 can match the policy this = . The predicate
match determines whether the action matches a downgrad-
ing policy pattern; we omit the straightforward deﬁnition of
when such patterns unify. We make this downgrading im-
plicit because most useful downgrading policies are simple
and it is easy to search (in the implementation of match)
for an usable downgrading action. To avoid searching, the
language could be extended with an optional construct that
speciﬁes the downgrading action as annotations on the op-
erator so that the type checker knows which action to use.
Conditional downgrading: The conditional expres-
sions in the policy language allow us to specify downgrad-
ing patterns with branches. This is achieved in the type sys-
tem by tracking the “active conditions” on the current ex-
ecution path. The if statements can have an optional tag L
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in its syntax. In the C-IF-PUB rule, the context Φ is used to
keep track of all the conditional expressions tags on the cur-
rent execution path. These tags are also annotated with ei-
ther +, indicating the “true” branch, or −, indicating the
“false” branch. Programs can use declassify and endorse
statements to downgrade the label of a value by specify-
ing the tag of the conditional expression that corresponds
to the if statement, and an action that matches the condi-
tional expression. Here again, a match(Γ, e, a) predicate
is needed to determine whether the expression e can in-
stantiate action a in context Γ. Intuitively, the tag L
mentioned in the downgrading operation provides the jus-
tiﬁcation for control ﬂow that validates the use of the
downgrading action. This is a novel extension of our ear-
lier type system [5] without breaking the relaxed nonin-
terference result: the relaxed noninterference of condi-
tional patterns can be be justiﬁed by an equivalence rule
“if e1 E[e2] e3 ≡ if e1 E[if e1 e2 c] e3” where E is an eval-
uation context, with some side conditions on the typing
contexts and variable bindings.
4.4. Information ﬂow control in the example
In Figure 6, lines 22-44 show a program fragment in the
web script. It uses the query GetID to authenticate the user
and uses the query FetchRecords to look up the user’s
history of transactions.
Reading query results: Line 23 submits a query to
the database and returns a handle q1 to the instance
of this query. Line 27 reads a row from the query re-
sults. When the variables (pwd,id) are added to the
context, their types are added to the typing context ac-
cording to the database interfaces. The variable pwd
has security level {this=*}!{pwd} and id has secu-
rity level {if (pwd=*) this 0}!{id}. The variable
names in the query interfaces are substituted by the ac-
tual instances in the C-READROW rule.
Implicit downgrading: Line 28 performs an implicit
downgrading in the conditional expression. The expres-
sion pwd=p corresponds to an action “this = ” for
the variable pwd, and we have ⇓ ({this = }, {this =
}) = public. Therefore, the expression pwd=p has secu-
rity level public ! tainted by using the E-OP rule, the CL-
DOWNGRADE(L) rule and the IL-TAINTED rule. The in-
formation leak on this expression is permitted by the policy
and the pc label inside the branch will be public. In con-
trast, in languages like Jif, downgrading must be performed
by using its declassify expression. Implicit downgrad-
ing also happens on line 33 for the variable y and on line
39 for the variable ccnum. The type system provides sub-
stantial guarantees about downgrading—all the downgrad-
ing must follow permissible downgrading paths speciﬁed by
the policies.
Conditional downgrading: When the if statement is
typechecked on line 28, the tag L AUTH and the conditional
expression (pwd=p) are stored in the context Φ. This in-
formation is used to justify further downgrading inside the
body of the branches. Line 31 shows such an example. The
declassify operation is a no-op at run-time. It merely serves
as a hint to the typechecker that a conditional test is in the
current execution path and the expression id can be down-
graded using an action corresponding to the conditional test
on line 28. First, the E-DECLASSIFY+ rule veriﬁes that
the action (pwd=*) matches the conditional expression
(pwd=p) that correspond to the tag L AUTH in the typ-
ing context. Then, the security level of id is downgraded
using the action (if (pwd=*) this 0) where 0 is an
arbitrary constant. Thus, the resulting conﬁdentiality label
for pub id is public. If the programmer does not perform
the required identity test (speciﬁed on line 6), the type sys-
tem will not permit the program to output the ID. This con-
ditional downgrading policy effectively enforces a run-time
identity test [15].
Writing query arguments: The declassify state-
ment only affects the conﬁdentiality label. The integrity la-
bel for pub id is still {id}. Line 33 calls another query
FetchRecords using the value pub id. According to
the C-QUERY rule, the interface of FetchRecords de-
mands that the ﬁrst argument has an untainted integrity
level. This is satisﬁed because {id}  untainted in our
framework. If the FetchRecords query used a tainted
value—perhaps obtained from user input—the type system
will detect such an error.
5. Discussion
5.1. Untrusted code, timing channels and side
effects
Our web scripting language is primarily intended as a
tool to help web-systems builders create more secure sys-
tems. As such, the main focus of this paper has been on
trusted code which is written without malicious intent.
Dealing with untrusted code is a much more difﬁcult prob-
lem. However, the downgrading and trust model described
in this paper differs from previous work in a couple signiﬁ-
cant ways.
In Jif, downgrading is controlled using the decentral-
ized label model, where each principal can only down-
grade its own policies. The DLM uses the notion of au-
thority as justiﬁcation for privileged operations; but author-
ity is not connected to the program semantics. As a result,
untrusted code (code without the authority of a principal
P) cannot downgrade data owned by P. Our language pro-
vides a complementary ability to specify downgrading poli-
cies based on required computation rather than using code
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privileges. This makes it possible to allow untrusted code
to perform downgrading in a safe manner as long as the
downgrading policies are correctly speciﬁed (and the un-
trusted code passes the typechecker). Of course, for un-
trusted code, the downgrading policies must be speciﬁed
conservatively with possible attacks in mind. For example,
the FetchRecords query is not safe to use in an untrusted
setting because the attacker can enumerate possible iden-
tity numbers and steal information from the database. This
problem can be solved by posing stronger policies on the
query interface, for example, using run-time identity tests
like the policy on line 6.
For conﬁdentiality, untrusted code can also leak informa-
tion through covert channels such as timing channels and
side effects. This problem is solved by requiring the pc la-
bel be public at all places where observable side effects are
possible to happen: loops, reading rows from queries, etc.
In the type system, the C-PRINT, C-WHILE, C-QUERY and
C-READROW all require the pc label to be public. This so-
lution is impractical for languages like Jif and FlowCaml,
because the explicit declassiﬁcation needed make it too
clumsy to allow useful programs be written. However, our
language makes it more practical, because many secret data
can be implicitly downgraded to public data before they af-
fect the pc label. The pc label is indeed public everywhere in
the example in Figure 6. It is also worth pointing out that the
control ﬂow in a web script is often simpler than other pro-
grams. Web scripts naturally use the continuation-passing
programming style andmany scripts execute for a very short
time. By limiting the conﬁdentiality label of the loop condi-
tion in the C-WHILE rule, timing channel leaks are largely
eliminated.
For trusted code, the requirement on the pc label can be
relaxed. Instead of rejecting a program, the typechecker can
raise appropriate warnings in the C-PRINT, C-WHILE, C-
QUERY and C-READROW rules, where conﬁdential infor-
mation can be leaked through covert channels.
The web scripting language presented in this paper is in-
tended to be a practical instantiation of a more theoretical
language in our earlier paper [5]. However, despite con-
ﬁdence in the type system presented here (as justiﬁed by
that previous work), we have not proved any formal secu-
rity guarantees about it. The security goal is harder to for-
malize than the relaxed noninterference result proved previ-
ously, because this language includes side effects and state.
A promising future direction is to formalize the security
guarantee for this language, perhaps by using a functional
variant of this language with monadic effects.
5.2. Related work
Language-based information-ﬂow control has been stud-
ied for some time [13]. Recent language prototypes such as
Jif [7], which extends Java, and FlowCaml [14], which ex-
tends Caml, provide nonstandard type systems that enforce
information-ﬂow policies. The security guarantee of such
type systems is usually formalized as noninterference [4, 6],
an end-to-end extensional guarantee that requires that no in-
formation propagates from high security levels to low secu-
rity levels. However, there have been very few practical ap-
plications that demonstrate the use of these security-typed
languages. In this paper, we have proposed to apply these
techniques to web scripting languages, for which security
concerns are increasingly important. The current state-of-
the art in web scripting protects data conﬁdentiality and
(perhaps more importantly) integrity in ad hoc ways. Here
we aim to do better, yet still provide a practical enforce-
ment mechanism.
One important challenge in making such an approach
practical is the problem of downgrading [8, 16, 3, 11, 2, 5].
Noninterference alone is too strong for practical use. For
conﬁdentiality, it is usually necessary that secret data can
be leaked to public places, but only in controlled ways. One
approach, the decentralized label model (DLM) [8] can con-
trol downgrading by using privileges associated with the
code. The DLM allows us to specify policies about who
can downgrade the data, but does not specify how the data
should be downgraded and what what is downgraded. As a
result, the end-to-end noninterference guarantee no longer
holds for code with downgrading.
Another problem is information integrity policies [1].
Although conﬁdentiality and integrity are usually consid-
ered as duals in information-ﬂow systems, the resulting in-
tegrity guarantee is weak. Noninterference guarantees only
that tainted data does not affect the values of the trusted,
untainted data, but it does not say anything about how the
trusted data are manipulated in the system. There is abso-
lutely no integrity guarantee for data coming from untrusted
code in the Jif language, because a malicious program can
manipulate the trusted data in arbitrary ways without using
tainted data. As a result, the two-dimensional DLM degen-
erates to a one-dimensional trust model or writers model for
integrity policies.
Recent advances in the research on downgrading ex-
tend the notion of noninterference by specifying downgrad-
ing policies as security levels and studies how the data are
downgraded. Relaxed noninterference [5] and delimited re-
lease [12] provide end-to-end security guarantees on down-
grading. In the relaxed noninterference framework [5], an
information-ﬂow type system is used to control downgrad-
ing in a ﬁne-grained manner according to the downgrad-
ing policies speciﬁed by the programmer. A secure pro-
gram can be proved to be equivalent to a special form where
all the downgrading are explicit and external to the body
of the program. The security guarantee can then be in-
terpreted in the model of delimited release [12] proposed
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by Sabelfeld and Myers, which states a weakened and
backward-compatible version of noninterference.
This paper integrates these theoretical frameworks to-
gether in a practical, domain-speciﬁc programming lan-
guage. The relaxed noninterference framework expresses
the downgrading policies as lambda calculus terms; manip-
ulating the policies requires higher-order uniﬁcation and ex-
tensive proof searching. In this paper, we simplify the pol-
icy language by using patterns to represent policies and use
straightforward pattern matching in type-checking to avoid
extensive searching. Instead of using an effect type system
to enforce delimited release [12], we simply require that all
the conﬁdential input variables are read-only variables. Fur-
thermore, the conditional downgrading policies can be used
to enforce run-time identity tests and achieve similar goals
with run-time principals [15].
6. Conclusion
This paper presents an architecture for obtaining
strong, end-to-end security in web-based online infor-
mation systems and motivates the use of language-based
information-ﬂow control in a web scripting language.
In this approach, information-ﬂow policies are speci-
ﬁed in the database query interfaces and enforced in the
web scripting language by a static type checker.
Based on prior research, this paper presents a framework
of downgrading policies using a simple and tractable pat-
tern language that connects implicit downgrading to com-
putations in the script. Integrity policies and conﬁdentiality
policies are treated symmetrically, leading to a clean and
intuitive way for programmers to describe their policies.
Moreover, this paper presents a novel downgrading mecha-
nism that works by tracking the conditional expressions in
the typing context and using them to enforce policies on
run-time conditions such as identity tests.
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